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1Abstract
We compare the relative labour market performance of immigrants to the United States and Great 
Britain over the period 1980-2000 when the degree of wage inequality and the stock of immigrants 
were rising in both countries and the labour market institutions of the two countries were evolving 
quite rapidly.  Using combined time series of cross section data for both countries, we construct 
three different measures of relative immigrant mobility in employment and wages and provide 
estimates of these measures over the period.  The results generally point toward a decline in 
mobility between 1980 and 2000 in both countries, particularly so for non-white immigrants. 
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2I. Introduction
Over the past twenty years, one of the most notable labour market developments, common to both 
Great Britain and the United States of America has been the rise in the number of immigrants 
coming to live and work in these countries. The share of immigrants increased from about 8 percent 
of the total U.S. working age population in 1980 to about 14 percent in 2000 and from 8% to 
around 11% in Great Britain, a boost to the respective domestic populations of some and 16 million 
and 1.8 million.
1  Over the same period, the labour markets of Britain and the United States have 
been subject to a series of demand shocks and changes in labour market institutions that have 
resulted in the relative labour market performance of less skilled workers deteriorate over this time. 
After several decades of real wage growth at rates that were similar across the distribution of 
wages, wage inequality increased sharply from about 1979. While much of this rise in inequality 
occurred within groups defined by education and work experience, higher measured returns to 
skills have driven an important part of the recent rise in wage inequality. Many of the labour market 
institutions in the two countries were also evolving quite rapidly over the same period, notably 
declining union presence at the workplace, declines in the real value of the minimum wage, or its 
closest UK equivalents the wages set by Wage Councils, along with changes to the welfare system 
in both countries.
2 
US immigration numbers are influenced both by both documented and undocumented 
immigration. Formal immigration policy has placed country-specific limits on the numbers of 
immigrants since the 1960s, and the system of preference categories embedded in visa applications 
is skewed toward skilled workers or workers in areas in which labour is in short supply, along with 
protection for refugees and reunification of families, (Wasem 2004a).  The 1990 Immigration Act 
introduced a system of visas allowing entry of high-tech workers with a sponsoring employer for 
up to 6 years (with the subsequent chance of applying for US citizenship) and also raised the share 
of employment-based visas in the total immigrant flow. In practice, this has meant that since the 
1   The native-born working age populations grew by  20 million and 1.8 million respectively over the same period as 
a result of the baby boom generation reaching maturity.
2   For analyses of the impact of immigrants on the US wage structure, see, among others: Altonji and Card (1991), 
Borjas (2000), Card (2001), and DeFreitas (1998). See Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston (2006) for the UK.
1beginning of the 1990s, documented immigration has been oriented towards highly qualified 
immigrants. However, because dependents of immigrants also qualify for entry, family ties account 
for around 60% of immigrant entries. Undocumented immigration to the United States is at least as 
important a source of immigration flows as documented immigration. The Congressional Research 
Service, for example, estimated that "unauthorized aliens" rose from about 1.9 million people in 
1988 to between 7.0 and 8.5 million by 2000, the latest year of data analyzed below, (see Wasem, 
2004b).   Undocumented  immigrants  tend  to  have  far   lower   educational   qualifications   than 
documented immigrants, including a large share with less than the equivalent of a high-school 
degree.
As regards the UK, policy has at times, sought to encourage immigrants from both ends of 
the skill distribution. In part this is because over the previous four decades, UK immigration policy 
has been greatly influenced by its links with former colonies. Before 1962, any commonwealth or 
Irish citizen had the right of entry into the UK. A system of work permits was introduced after that 
point and the principle of right of entry to commonwealth citizens was abolished in 1973, replaced 
by a system of work permits, (again skewed toward skilled workers in short supply) and entry 
rights for dependents that has continued, subject to periodic modifications, to this day, allied to 
unrestricted right of entry to immigrants from European Union member states.  Estimates of illegal 
immigration numbers are harder to come by for the UK. The only official estimate of illegal 
immigration based on similar methods as in the U.S., (Woodbridge 2005), puts the number of 
illegal immigrants, adults and children combined, in 2001 at 430,000.
3 
The focus of this paper is on the impact that the combined effect of these structural changes 
may have had on the wages and mobility of immigrants. While many studies focus on the impact of 
immigration on native-born workers, (eg. Card (2001), Borjas (2003)), relatively little attention is 
given to the performance of immigrants in the host labour market. Yet two recent studies have 
suggested that the largest labour market effects of immigration in the host country may be on 
immigrants, essentially because immigrant workers appear to be imperfect substitutes for native 
3  If true, this would amount to an additional 10% of the immigrant stock.
2born workers, (Ottaviano and Peri (2005) for the United States and Manacorda, Manning and 
Wadsworth (2005) for Great Britain).
4 For policy purposes it is important to know if immigrants 
benefit from economic conditions in the host country and, if so, how quickly they adapt. This paper 
uses micro data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 US Censuses and the time series of cross-sections 
taken from the British General Household Survey, (GHS), over the same period to examine and 
compare how rapidly immigrant wages and employment converge on the wage and employment 
levels of native-born workers with similar skills in the two countries, to evaluate how much wages 
rise with immigrants' time spent in the respective host countries relative to more recent immigrants 
and how these features have changed over the period. Section 2 outlines the concepts used to 
measure integration and mobility of immigrants in the labour market. Section 3 discusses the data 
sets used in this study. Section 4 outlines the main results of the study while section 5 concludes.
2. Measuring the Mobility of Immigrants
Ideally, we would like to measure the mobility of immigrants using data from a large panel survey 
that followed several waves of workers – both native- and foreign born – over a long enough period 
of time to give a clear picture of immigrant workers' mobility, both in real terms and relative to 
other workers. Unfortunately, no such large, multi-wave, panel surveys exist. The absence of such 
surveys forces us to rely, instead, on measurement based on large, repeated, cross-sectional surveys 
of the labour force, such as the Decennial Census in the US or the GHS for Britain. 
i) Convergence 
The first measure of mobility uses US-born or British-born workers as a point of reference. This 
approach asks on average, whether the wages or employment of immigrant workers equal native-
born wage or employment levels. One simple way to do this is to add a dummy variable for 
immigrant status into a wage or employment equation. The coefficient on the immigrant dummy 
then gives the average difference in pay or employment between immigrants and native-born. By 
comparing the coefficient over time or across different sub-groups of immigrant, it is possible to 
assess the overall change in performance of immigrants in the labour market. 
4  Whether this is due to assimilation problems, discrimination or unmeasured skills has not yet been established.
3ii) Returns to experience in the host country
Much of the debate over immigration effects concerns the speed of adaptation to a host 
country’s labour market institutions. Since the Census and GHS data record the year of arrival
5, we 
can use an alternative measure of convergence to native-born wage and employment levels by 
taking the entire sample and regressing hourly earnings (or employment) against dummy variables 
that group immigrants by the number of years in the host country, (0-5, 6-10, 11-15, etc.). The 
dummy variables for years in the host country effectively partition the simple binary variable for 
immigrant status into mutually exclusive categories based on years-since-migration; each of these 
years-since-migration variables takes the value zero for native born workers. Recent immigrants, on 
average, might be expected to earn less than the average worker if there were assimilation problems 
or institutional barriers, so that the coefficient for this group will be negative. At some point over 
the course of their time in the host country, however, the wage and employment prospects of the 
average immigrant worker may converge on that of the average native-born worker. At that point, 
the coefficient on the binary years in the country dummy variable would equal zero. For 
immigrants beyond that point of convergence, the coefficient on the other years in the country 
variables could be positive, reflecting a wage premium for longer-term immigrants.
Estimating such equations at different periods of time can reveal changes in immigrant 
mobility in at least two ways. The first is through changes in the estimated point of convergence. If 
mobility relative to native-born workers increased, for example, the point of convergence might 
occur earlier, say, after 11-15 years, instead of after 16-20 years. Conversely, if mobility declined, 
we might expect to see the estimated point of convergence recede. The second indicator of changes 
in mobility is a change in the measured wage or employment premiums (or penalties) for a given 
amount of time spent in the host country. If mobility increased, we might expect to see lower 
penalties for immigrants at shorter durations or higher premiums for longer duration immigrants, 
independent of any changes in the point of convergence with native-born wages.
5  The former data set records years of arrival in 5 year bands, the latter by individual year. To facilitate comparison 
we group the British data into similar 5 year bands as in the US data.
4One limitation of the approach is that it does not control for workers' characteristics and, 
therefore, implicitly compares the average immigrant worker in each of the "time in the host 
country" categories with the average native-born worker. One obvious drawback of this design is 
that immigrants that have been in the US or Great Britain for a long period of time are almost 
mechanically much older than the average native-born worker, and these extra years of (potential) 
work experience act to raise the wages of immigrants for reasons that have little to do with usual 
notions of mobility. Immigrant and US-born workers differ with respect to educational attainment, 
and the composition of immigrant population by country of origin may also vary greatly from one 
sample point to the next.  Fortunately, we can add a basic set of controls to try to account for this. 
A second well-known limitation of this approach is that, in practice, we cannot distinguish 
between years-since-migration and cohort effects, (Borjas 1985, 1994). The coefficients on the 
years-since-migration variables rather than representing the returns to time in the host country, 
could also reflect year-of-arrival cohort effects - systematic differences in the characteristics (and 
macroeconomic conditions) of the cohorts that arrived in the periods 1975-1980, 1970-1974 and so 
on.
6  It is also possible that return migration will influence these estimates. If immigrants leave the 
host country, then comparing years of arrival estimates at a point in time may be influenced by 
differential return rates across the year of arrival groupings.
7
iii) Comparison of cohorts
Both of the first two approaches to measuring mobility use contemporaneous workers as the 
reference point for gauging changes in immigrant mobility. Our final approach to measuring 
mobility, compares gains (or losses) experienced by immigrants in recent periods (in the ten years 
ending in 2000, say) with gains (or losses) experienced by immigrants over a comparable period of 
6   That the coefficients better reflect returns to time in the country than they do cohort-effects, rests on several 
assumptions supported by the data. First, as we shall see, neither the raw, nor the regression-controlled estimates of 
the years-since-migration variables show any strong cohort effects (such as a strong positive or negative effects 
associated with a particular cohort as it moves through successive periods). Second, the regression-controlled 
equations control for age and experience, factors that are likely to capture much of why the data might exhibit strong 
cohort effects in the first place. Finally, the main aim of the paper is to measure whether mobility has changed over 
time. The separation of cohort from time-in-the-country effects may contribute to an understanding of any changes 
we observe, but the first task is to determine whether the relative position of immigrant workers has changed.
7  It is difficult to estimate return rates because the GHS does not contain population weights that would allow the 
comparison of appropriate cell group numbers over time. The US census does have population weights, but they 
appear to be inconsistent across time, making inter-temporal comparisons difficult.
5time in an earlier period (in the ten years ending in 1990, for example). This approach is the closest 
in spirit to the ideal based on a multi-wave panel survey. In the absence of true panel data however, 
this technique has several limitations. In particular, we can only follow changes in the average 
wages or employment levels of cohorts (by year-of-arrival), not the actual changes experienced by 
each individual. Moreover, since we do not have retrospective data on wages and employment, in 
order to include a particular cohort in our analysis, we must observe the cohort in at least two of the 
three data points.
With three data points spaced ten years apart, we can compare the real wage and 
employment growth over ten years for different groups of workers over two time periods 1980-
1990 and 1990-2000. We can, for example, calculate the average change in wages between 1980 
and 1990 for recently arrived immigrants in 1980 by looking at the average wage for the cohort that 
arrived in 1975-1979 in both the 1980 and 1990 data. We can then measure the average change in 
wages or employment between 1990 and 2000 for recently arrived immigrants in 1990 by 
calculating the average for the cohort that arrived in 1985-1989 in the 1990 and 2000 data. If 
mobility increased between the first period (1980-1990) and the second period (1990-2000), we 
would expect real wage or employment growth to be faster for the cohort that arrived in 1985-1989 
than it was for the cohort that arrived in 1975-1979. Similarly, if mobility decreased between the 
two periods, we might expect wage or employment growth to be slower in the second period than 
the first.
By construction, both of the cohorts in this example had an average of 2.5 years of time in 
the host country in the first period and an average of 12.5 years in the host country in the second 
period. By choosing cohorts that initially had 7.5 years of time in the country in the first period 
(immigrants that arrived in 1970-1974 in 1980 and 1980-1984 in 1990), and 12.5 years (arrived in 
1965-1969 in 1980 and 1975-1979 in 1990), and so on, we can construct a set of matched cohorts 
that can give a more complete picture of mobility for immigrants with different amounts of time in 
the host country.
6We can again introduce controls for differences in age and education, factors that could 
have an important impact on wage and employment growth. The simplest technique is to pool the 
data for two consecutive periods for each cohort and then fit a regression of the form:
 w = a + bG + cX + u (1)
where G is a binary variable that takes the value one for observations in the second of the two 
periods, X is a vector of control variables related to region, age and education and u is a residual 
term.  In this equation, the coefficient b then gives the regression-controlled real-wage growth for 
the particular cohort over the ten-year period. However, if overall wage (employment) growth were 
lower in the second period than it was in the first for all workers (perhaps because productivity 
growth decelerated), then we would conclude that the mobility of immigrants had declined, even 
though it might not have declined when measured relative to growth rates obtained by US-born 
workers. 
One way to attempt to isolate changes in the mobility of immigrants is to employ a simple 
difference-in-differences strategy. This involves comparing the difference in ten-year growth rates 
in real wages across matched cohorts of immigrants with the difference in ten-year growth rates in 
real wages for native-born workers over the same periods. 
  w = a + bG + bIMI + bIM_GG*I  + cX + u (2)
As in equation (1), G would take the value one if the worker was in the second period of the two 
pooled data and I is a dummy variable indicating immigrant status. The coefficient on the 
interaction term, bIM_G, (the difference-in-difference estimate) then gives an estimate of the growth 
rate for any immigrant cohort over and above that of native-born workers wages across the two 
periods, controlling for differences in the age and educational attainment.  In the final step, we 
would compare the change in this immigrant premium (penalty) for the same year of arrival groups 
at different points in time.  If immigrants were doing better over time we might expect to see the 
difference-in-difference estimates to become larger over time.
3. The Data
7The main source of U.S. data is a consistent extract of labour-market variables from the 
one-percent version of the Public Use Micro data Sample (PUMS) for the 1980, 1990, and 2000 
decennial Censuses. In addition to an extensive set of standard labour-market variables, the PUMS 
includes information on an individual's country of birth, year of arrival to the United States, 
citizenship, and self-assessed English-language proficiency. The main sample of immigrants 
analyzed here are adult (18 or older) men and women born outside the United States and outlying 
areas, including those who entered the United States as children. The US-born sample includes all 
adult men and women born in the United States and comprises around 1.7 million observations in 
each year, of which around 1.3 million give hourly wage data. The dependent variable used to 
measure differences in pay is the natural log of the average hourly wage in the calendar year before 
each census, deflated by the relevant consumer price index value. The dependent variable used to 
measure presence in employment is derived from self-assessed labour market status questions in 
the US census which approximate the ILO definition of employment.
The data for Great Britain are taken from the GHS from 1977 to 2003. Since the British 
data sets are much smaller than the US data, we pool 7 years of data centred on each of the three 
years covered by the US census, so that the British data coded as 1980, for example, contain 
individual responses from the 1977-1983 GHS. This gives a total of around 100,000 observations in 
each “decade”, of which around 50,000 have wage data. The dependent variable used to measure 
differences in pay is the natural log of the average hourly wage in the reference week of each 
survey, deflated by the appropriate monthly value of the retail price index.
8 The dependent variable 
used to measure presence in employment is derived from self-assessed labour market status 
questions which, from 1998 onward, correspond to the ILO definition of employment and are close 
to the ILO definition before that. The definitions of immigrant and native born are similar to those 
used for the US data. An immigrant to Britain is simply an individual who was born outside the 
host country.
9
8  In practice, the U.S. hourly wage is derived by dividing annual gross pay by 52 (weeks) by usual weekly hours, 
while the British hourly wage is derived by dividing gross weekly wage by usual weekly hours.
9  This may, of course, include children born to British/U.S. citizens living abroad, though the data are unable to 
distinguish these individuals. There is no way of determining how many of the immigrants in the surveys are 
undocumented.
8Different cohorts of immigrants could consist of different sets of (unobservable) skills, such 
as language, quality of education. Changes in these characteristics over time, could help explain 
any changes in the relative labour market position of immigrants. To proxy these effects we 
introduce a set of area of origin dummy variables, which reflect the effect in each period of 
originating from these different areas. Since the British data are quite small, we are obliged to 
restrict area of origin to eight broad geographic areas reflecting the share of the region in the total 
stock of immigrants and possible English language fluency. For Britain we use Ireland, the rest of 
Europe, India and Pakistan, Africa, Central and Southern America, the Caribbean, the Old 
Commonwealth and a residual “Other” category. For the United States, the area groupings are; 
Mexico, Canada, the Americas, the Caribbean, Africa, the English speaking countries of Australia, 
New Zealand, Ireland and the U.K., the rest of Europe and a residual “other” category.
4. Results
The changing composition of immigrants both across time and relative to native born 
workers is outlined in Table 1.  One striking fact immediately apparent from the Table, is that most 
immigrants to the US are relatively less educated, while most immigrants to Britain are relatively 
highly educated. In the U.S., as immigration has risen, so has the general level of educational 
attainment among immigrants, though it remains lower, on average, than among native born 
workers. In contrast, the mix of immigrants to Britain has become much more highly educated over 
time, more so than the rate of increase in educational attainment among the native born population 
in Britain. The change is reflected in the relatively young age of immigrants compared to native 
born, particularly in the 25-44 age groupings.
10
Rising immigration has also been associated with a change in the country of origin mix (see 
Table 2). In the US, the trend is for more immigration from the Americas at the expense of Europe, 
in particular the share of immigrants from Mexico is even larger in 2000 than in 1980. Nearly one 
10  The British data on immigrant qualifications is also likely to under-estimate the level of education. Manacorda et 
al. (2005) show that many immigrants with qualifications obtained overseas are wrongly classified as having “other” 
qualifications, when their true level is often higher. We are obliged to use qualifications rather than age left education 
in order to facilitate comparisons across the two country data sets.
9in three immigrants to the US is from Mexico. In contrast, immigration by country of origin is 
becoming much more heterogeneous in Britain. While the share of immigrants from Europe is also 
falling in Britain over this period, and the share of immigrants from Africa rising, by 2000 no 
single country dominates the country of origin mix to the same extent as in the USA. India has 
overtaken Ireland as the source country for the largest number of immigrants, but this is less than 
10 percent of the immigrant population.
Relative Labour Market Performance
Table 3 outlines the change in the relative employment position of immigrants, separately 
for all individuals (panel a), men (panel b), and women (panel c) and then by ethnicity for each 
group. The first row shows the gap for the "raw" data which controls only for region of residence 
(in an effort to control for regional differences in the employment combined with the uneven 
distribution of immigrants throughout the country). The unadjusted estimates suggest that the 
relative employment position of immigrants has deteriorated steadily over the three decades in the 
U.S., but remained stable in Britain since 1990. However, once we control for differences in the 
age and educational composition between immigrants and native-born observed in Table 1, then the 
employment position of immigrants to Britain can be seen to have deteriorated more than for 
immigrants to the U.S.  In Britain, the aggregate fall disguises much larger relative decline for non-
white immigrants and women in general. In the U.S. there is little difference between non-white 
and white immigrants, but the aggregate estimates obscure much larger falls in relative employment 
among female immigrants.
Conditional on being in work, Table 4 presents estimates of the hourly wage gap (in log 
points) between immigrants and native-born workers from the 1980, 1990, and 2000.  On this basis, 
the average immigrant to the United States receives lower wages than US-born workers and this 
pay gap has more than doubled over the sample period from around 6 to 13%. When we make 
allowances for differences in age and education between immigrants and native born, the pay gaps 
fall by around half, and the downward trend is no longer apparent. The pay gap is around twice as 
large for immigrant men as for immigrant women and most of the pay gap is between non-white 
10immigrants and the native born. White immigrants in the U.S. are paid, on average, similar amounts 
to native-born workers.  In Great Britain, the situation is more mixed. Without controls there is 
much less difference in the raw pay of immigrants relative to British-born workers. However, when 
allowance is made for differences by age and education, then pay gaps are more apparent. 
Immigrants now receive lower wages relative to British born workers of a similar magnitude as in 
the U.S. and, as in the U.S., most of this pay gap is among non-white immigrants. Again, the pay 
gaps are higher for male immigrants than female immigrants. 
Returns to time in the host country
Table 5 summarises the average relative employment position of immigrants over time 
conditional on years spent in the host country. The table presents the employment gap between 
native-born workers adjusted for differences in age, education and region of residence.  Reading 
down each column gives one representation of the speed of convergence of immigrants' wages to 
those of native-born workers. For men, in 1980, for example, recent immigrants (0-5 years in the 
United States) were about 7 percentage points less likely to be in employment than the average U.S. 
born worker. After 6-10 years in the country, the immigrant employment gap becomes positive and 
remains so thereafter, suggesting that immigrants employment prospects after this length of time 
had converged to the US average, or were better than average. A similar prospect can be seen for 
employment of immigrant women.  Over time, the point of convergence for men has fallen. The 
employment gap at 0-5 years is much smaller and the other lengths of time estimates are close to, 
or insignificantly different from zero. In contrast, the employment position of female immigrants to 
the U.S. appears to have deteriorated rapidly. All the estimates on the length of time variables are 
negative in 2000, suggesting a widespread fall in employment prospects.  For Britain, the relative 
employment position of immigrants, both male and female, is notably lower and has remained low 
over time. Tables 5b and 5c repeat the exercise for white and non-white immigrants respectively, 
measured relative to all native-born workers. For Britain and the U.S., there is little difference in 
the pattern by ethnicity.
11One possible explanation for these changes over time is that the changing immigrant stock 
could have helped make the relative employment position of female immigrants to the U.S 
deteriorate.  Table A1 in the appendix gives the estimates for years in the host country net of 
controls for area of origin. There is very little change in the years in the country estimates for both 
Britain and the U.S. If anything, the U.S. estimates are even more negative, suggesting that the 
changing area mix of origin does not underlie any deterioration in the relative employment position 
of immigrant women to the U.S.
Table 6 reports the results of a similar analysis for relative wage levels conditional on years 
in the host country. The country specific patterns are now reversed. The wage gaps conditional on 
years since arrival are much larger in the U.S. than in Britain, particularly for men.  In Britain there 
does not appear to have been much change in these patterns over time. For the U.S. however the 
point of convergence between immigrant and native wages appears to have lengthened for both 
men and women. Again these aggregate estimates disguise very different trends across broad ethnic 
groupings. All of the deterioration in wage convergence in the U.S. can be seen to be among non-
white immigrants
11. If anything, the relative convergence pattern for white immigrants to the U.S. 
has improved.
When we add area of origin effects, the U.S. estimates become, if anything, more negative, 
(Table A2). As with the employment estimates, it seems that the changing area mix of origin does 
not underlie any deterioration in the relative wage position of immigrants to the U.S. The results for 
Britain are poorly determined, reflecting the much smaller size of the British data, so it is hard to 
conclude much about area of origin effects here.
10 year Changes by cohort
Tables 7 and 8 presents the results of the third test of immigrant mobility. The tables give 
the difference-in-difference estimates of employment (Table 7) and real wage growth (Table 8) for 
four cohorts of arrival, matched across the 1980, 1990, and 2000 data according to years of 
experience in the host country.  The first row of each Table summarises the trends for relatively 
11  Indeed there never was “convergence” for non-white immigrants over the sample period.
12recent immigrants. The first column shows the ten-year growth between 1980 and 1990 for the 
group of immigrants that arrived between 1975 and 1979. This group of immigrants had an average 
of about 2.5 years of time in the country in 1980 and an average of about 12.5 years in 1990. The 
second column shows the trajectory between 1990 and 2000 of the corresponding group of 
immigrants that arrived ten years later. These immigrants arrived between 1985 and 1989 and had 
about 2.5 years of experience in 1990 and about 12.5 years by 2000. 
The results of this third measure of immigrant mobility are somewhat ambiguous. In the 
first decade of the sample period, employment growth was similar to that of native born-workers 
for all immigrant men, with the exception of those in the country for more than 15 years, who did 
better, on average, than native born workers. A similar pattern is apparent for immigrant women. 
The coefficients in columns 2 (women) and 4 (women) for the second decade of the sample period 
are generally smaller than in columns 1 (men) or 3 (women). So the relative employment 
advantages observed by some immigrants in the 1980s were not as apparent in the 1990s. The 
addition of area of origin controls, (Table A3), again does not change these conclusions 
substantially. The aggregate numbers do obscure different growth patterns among white and non-
white immigrants. Employment growth among non-white immigrants to the U.S. was lower than 
for white immigrants, though in Britain the trends are more mixed.
Table 8 shows that wages of immigrants to the U.S. in all four cohorts grew faster than 
wages of native-born men, though there was a marked slow-down in this advantage in the last 
decade. If relative wage prospects for these cohorts of immigrants improved at the same time as the 
overall relative wage for immigrants in the U.S. was falling (see Table 4), then it must be that 
relative wage growth for other immigrant groups deteriorated. In Britain immigrant wages grew at 
broadly the same rate as native born workers. There is relatively little difference in these growth 
rates by ethnicity and area of origin effects, (Table A4) do not change these results substantially.
Conclusions
13This paper set out to use repeated cross-section data from 1980, 1990, and 2000 to measure changes 
in the relative labour market performance of immigrants to Great Britain and the United States 
against a background of rising immigration in both countries and a shift in demand away from less 
skilled workers. The average employment and wage gap between immigrants and native-born 
appears to have risen in both countries over time, much more so for non-white immigrants. 
Convergence to native-born levels of employment and wages conditional on years in the host 
country also fell, with the point of convergence between immigrant men occurring later in 2000 
than it did in 1980.  Ten-year employment rate changes for matched immigrant cohorts, suggest 
that relative employment mobility fell in the United States and at best constant in Great Britain over 
the sample period. Ten-year wage growth rates, while higher than that of native born workers were 
also, generally, lower however, in the second decade of the sample period.  These changes are net 
of any differences in age, education between immigrants and native-born workers. Nor does the 
changing area of origin mix of immigrants appear to affect these conclusions substantially. With 
immigration levels continuing to rise in both countries after our sample period ends, policy makers 
may need to turn their attention to the causes of these relative disadvantages that appear to be the 
lot of many immigrants.
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17Table 1a Characteristics of US sample, age 18-64 (% share)
Men Women
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
US born 92.9 90.1 85.7 92.6 90.4 86.5
Age
18-24 22.3 16.8 15.4 21.6 16.0 14.6
25-34 27.3 27.1 21.2 26.7 27.1 21.1
35-44 18.6 24.7 25.9 18.4 24.7 25.9
45-54 16.4 17.0 22.7 16.7 17.0 22.8
55-64 15.4 14.3 14.9 16.6 14.8 15.5
Education
Primary 9.0 5.1 3.1  7.5 4.0 2.4
LTHS 16.9 14.4 12.9 17.5 13.8 11.0
HS 32.8 31.3 31.0 39.1 34.4 30.2
Some college 23.1 28.2 30.3 23.3 30.2 34.0
College 8.5 13.6 14.9 6.8 12.4 15.2
Advanced 9.8 7.4 7.8 5.8 5.3 7.2
Employed (18-64) 80.9 80.7 77.2 56.4 65.3 67.2
Foreign born 7.1 9.9 14.3 7.4 9.6 13.5
Years in US
0-5 26.1 23.2 22.5 22.2 21.0 20.2
5-10 18.8 20.3 16.8 18.1 18.0 17.7
11-15 15.7 15.5 16.4 16.0 14.6 15.6
16-20 12.1 13.1 14.6 13.1 13.6 13.9
21-30 17.0 16.5 17.7 18.4 19.3 18.4
31+ 10.3 11.4 12.1 12.3 13.6 14.3
Age
18-24 19.8 18.3 15.8 16.7 15.1 13.4
25-34 21.3 31.2 28.9 27.6 28.7 27.1
35-44 21.1 24.4 26.8 22.1 24.9 27.0
45-54 16.3 15.4 18.3 18.2 17.7 19.6
55-64 13.4 10.7 10.3 15.4 13.7 12.8
Education
Primary 24.1 22.3 21.6 24.7 21.4 19.4
LTHS 13.1 15.8 17.2 13.3 15.3 15.5
HS 20.7 18.0 19.0 28.1 22.4 20.6
Some college 20.6 21.2 19.0 20.4 23.0 22.6
College 7.5 12.3 12.7 6.6 12.1 14.3
Advanced 14.0 10.4 10.5 7.0 5.8 7.7
Employed (18-64) 80.8 81.2 73.4 53.2 57.9 54.2
18Table 1b. Characteristics of UK Sample, Working Age 18-64/59  (% share)
Men Women
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
GB born 92.4 92.1 90.6 92.2 91.3 89.6
Age
18-24 16.7 16.1 12.1 17.8 17.5 13.4
25-34 23.9 24.2 21.1 26.1 26.9 24.1
35-44 21.0 23.0 24.7 22.6 24.8 27.2
45-54   19.5 19.6 22.6 21.8 21.4 24.1
55-64 18.8 17.1 19.4 11.7 9.4 11.2
Education
Primary 43.9 30.5 19.0 53.5 34.8 19.6
LTHS 30.7 32.0 31.0 31.9 40.5 33.7
HS 9.5 14.4 18.5 4.4 9.1 19.0
Some college 8.1 11.6 12.7 7.1 9.3 11.9
College 7.0 9.8 13.8 2.9 5.9 12.3
Advanced 0.9 1.7 5.0 0.2 0.6 3.5
Employed  86.7 81.0 81.6 61.7 67.1 72.3
Inactive 6.6 10.6 14.7 34.3 28.3 25.2
Foreign born 7.6 7.9 9.3 7.8 8.7 10.4
Years in GB
0-5 7.8 9.3 20.6 11.3 11.3 19.8
5-10 12.5 6.6 12.0 15.0 9.5 13.6
11-15 15.5 10.9 8.4 16.9 11.2 11.5
16-20 19.7 12.9 7.7 18.6 15.2 8.7
21-30 24.8 31.0 18.0 22.3 31.0 19.9
31+ 19.6 29.6 33.3 16.0 21.8 26.4
Age
18-24 14.5 11.5 11.6 16.2 13.4 11.1
25-34 25.2 24.9 26.3 28.0 28.6 29.8
35-44 22.6 24.6 26.5 25.4 27.6 27.9
45-54 20.7 20.5 21.4 21.7 21.7 23.8
55-64 17.1 18.5 14.2 8.8 8.7 7.4
Education
Primary 47.4 35.4 18.8 50.6 34.6 18.7
LTHS 31.9 32.3 29.0 35.0 37.9 29.5
HS 7.7 11.2 11.8 3.5 9.2 13.5
Some college 5.2 8.2 8.8 8.2 11.3 11.3
College 6.3 9.8 21.6 2.3 6.0 18.9
Advanced 1.5 3.1 10.1 0.4 1.1 8.1
Employed  79.7 73.9 75.6 55.2 58.4 59.8
Inactive 9.9 14.3 18.2 40.2 36.3 36.6
19Table 2. Area Origin of Immigrants to United States and Great Britain , 1980-2005
1980 1990 2000
U.S.A.
Europe 33.1 21.7 15.4
Asia 21.6 27.1 26.4
Africa 1.9 2.0 2.8
Americas 42.8 48.6 54.8
Oceania 0.7 0.6 0.6
Largest Donors
1 Mexico      (16.3) Mexico      (23.0) Mexico      (30.7)
2 Germany    (6.5) Germany    (4.9) Phillipines  (4.7)
3 Canada       (5.9) Phillipines  (4.9) Vietnam      (3.3)
4 Cuba           (4.9) Cuba           (3.7) Germany     (3.2)
5 U.K.           (4.6) Canada       (3.5) India            (3.0)
6 Italy            (4.6) U.K.           (3.4) China          (2.8)
7 Phillipines  (4.0) Korea         (3.0) Korea          (2.7)
8 China         (2.4) Vietnam     (2.8) Canada        (2.5)
9 Japan          (2.2) China         (2.6) Cuba           (2.4)
10 Poland        (2.0) Italy            (2.4) U.K.            (2.3)
U.K.
Europe 41.6 35.9 32.2
Asia 28.0 32.9 32.4
Africa 11.8 15.0 19.7
Americas 16.3 13.2 11.8
Oceania 2.3 3.0 3.9
Largest Donors
1 Ireland      (19.3)    Ireland      (15.8)    India            (9.6)
2 India         (13.3) India         (12.3) Ireland        (8.9)
3 Jamaica      (6.2) Pakistan    (7.3) Pakistan      (6.8)
4 Pakistan      (5.8) Germany    (4.4) Germany     (5.3)
5 Italy            (4.3) Jamaica      (4.0) Bangladesh  (4.4)
6 Germany    (3.6) Kenya        (3.6) Kenya          (3.5)
7 Kenya         (3.2) U.S.A.        (3.4) U.S.A.         (3.2)
8 U.S.A.        (2.9) Italy            (2.5) S. Africa      (2.9)
9 Poland        (2.7) Bangladesh (2.5) Jamaica      (2.7)
10 Cyprus        (2.5) Cyprus        (2.3) Australia     (2.6)
Note: population of working age
20Table 3. Effect of Immigrant Status on Employment Probability, 1980-2000
Great Britain United States
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Men
Immigrant -0.086 -0.100 -0.074 -0.002 0.003 -0.029
(0.007)* (0.008)* (0.009)* (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)*
Controlling for:
Age, education -0.087 -0.078 -0.089 0.014 0.028 0.004
(0.007)* (0.008)* (0.010)* (0.002)* (0.002)* (0.001)*
White
-0.058 -0.028 -0.057 0.017 0.011 0.013
(0.009)* (0.010)* (0.015)* (0.003)* (0.003)* (0.003)*
Other
-0.119 -0.126 -0.138 0.013 0.037 0.001
(0.011)* (0.012)* (0.016)* (0.002)* (0.002)* (0.002)
Women
Immigrant  -0.092 -0.106 -0.125 -0.041 -0.082 -0.126
(0.008)* (0.008)* (0.009)* (0.002)* (0.002)* (0.002)*
Controlling for:
Age, education -0.079 -0.073 -0.113 -0.007 -0.031 -0.074
(0.008)* (0.009)* (0.010)* (0.002)* (0.002)* (0.002)*
White
-0.045 -0.017 -0.078 -0.020 -0.048 -0.065
(0.011)* (0.012) (0.015)* (0.003)* (0.003)* (0.003)*
Other
-0.128 -0.141 -0.155 0.008* -0.020 -0.075
(0.013)* (0.013)* (0.016)* (0.003) (0.003)* (0.002)*
Notes: * significant at 5%; robust standard errors in brackets. Sample sizes GB are 116960, 100045 63972, in 1980, 
1990, 2000 respectively and 60326, 51280, 32281 for men and 56634, 48765, 31691 for women. For the US, sample 
sizes are 1369240, 1,518,093 1,708,990 in 1980, 1990, 2000; 668,154, 744,085 843,639 for men and 701,086 
774,008, 865,351 for women. Coefficients are marginal effects from a probit regression where the dependent 
variable is a dummy variable for being in work. Coefficients are percentage point differences (/100) relative to 
native-born workers; all regressions control for 51 states of residence or 11 GB regions. Age and education controls 
are binary variables created by interacting 5 age dummies with six education levels (primary only, incomplete 
secondary, secondary, some college, degree, higher degree).
21Table 4. Effect of Immigrant Status on log hourly wage, 1980-2000
Great Britain United States
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Men
Immigrant  -0.049 -0.074 -0.040 -0.093 -0.173 -0.184
(0.008)* (0.014)* (0.016)* (0.004)* (0.003)* (0.003)*
Controlling for:
Age, education -0.046 -0.093 -0.073 -0.069 -0.095 -0.094
(0.007)* (0.013)* (0.014)* (0.004)* (0.003)* (0.003)*
White
-0.003 0.008  0.030 0.025 0.033 0.027
(0.010) (0.017) (0.021) (0.006)* (0.005)* (0.005)*
Other
-0.095 -0.218 -0.181 -0.146* -0.159* -0.134*
(0.010)* (0.018)* (0.021)* (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Women
Immigrant  -0.015 0.014 0.002 -0.034* -0.096 -0.107
(0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.005) (0.004)* (0.003)*
Controlling for:
Age, education -0.031 -0.006 -0.048 -0.011* -0.041 -0.048
(0.009)* (0.011) (0.013)* (0.004) (0.004)* (0.003)*
White
-0.025 0.035 -0.017 0.010 0.003 -0.008
(0.011)* (0.014)* (0.018) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Other
-0.041 -0.071 -0.110 -0.026* -0.065* -0.063*
(0.013)* (0.017)* (0.020)* (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Notes: * significant at 5%; robust standard errors in brackets. Sample sizes GB are 69467, 54794 36784, in 1980, 
1990, 2000 respectively and 39666, 28230, 18324 for men and 29801, 26564, 18460 for women. For the US, sample 
sizes are 998,010 1,156,840 1,303,470 in 1980, 1990, 2000; 554,640 613,991 680,697 for men and 443,370 542,849 
622,773 for women. PUMS1% and pooled GHS files. Coefficients are from a regression where the dependent 
variable is the natural log of the real hourly wage. Coefficients are log point differential (/100) relative to native-born 
workers.
22Table 5a. Age, education controlled effect of time in host country on employment probability 
of immigrants, 1980-2000: with respect to native-born workers
Great Britain United States
Years here 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Men
0-5 -0.280 -0.274 -0.204 -0.072* -0.023* -0.025*
(0.034)* (0.034)* (0.024)* (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
6-10 -0.114 -0.140 -0.113 0.040* 0.033* -0.003
(0.023)* (0.037)* (0.029)* (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
11-15 -0.078 -0.120 -0.094 0.055* 0.035* -0.006#
(0.019)* (0.030)* (0.033)* (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
16-20 -0.053 -0.075 -0.093 0.043* 0.041* -0.004
(0.015)* (0.023)* (0.033)* (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
21-30 -0.051 -0.043 -0.049 0.060* 0.041* 0.017*
(0.014)* (0.015)* (0.022)* (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
31+ -0.048 -0.049 -0.047 0.025* 0.032* 0.019*
(0.014)* (0.014)* (0.014)* (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Women
0-5 -0.251 -0.214 -0.225 -0.101* -0.158* -0.205*
(0.028)* (0.030)* (0.024)* (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
6-10 -0.137 -0.224 -0.191 0.021* -0.038* -0.115*
(0.024)* (0.031)* (0.027)* (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
11-15 -0.113 -0.191 -0.197 0.056* -0.012* -0.071*
(0.023)* (0.028)* (0.029)* (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
16-20 -0.062 -0.056 -0.142 0.004 0.010* -0.026*
(0.021)* (0.023)* (0.032)* (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
21-30 -0.026 -0.021 -0.057 0.010* 0.012* -0.007*
(0.018) (0.016) (0.021)* (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
31+ -0.029 0.002 -0.012 -0.012 -0.018* -0.013*
(0.022) (0.018) (0.017) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Notes: See Table 1
23Table 5b. Effect of time in host country on employment probability of white immigrants, 
1980-2000: with respect to native-born workers
Great Britain United States
Years here 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Men
0-5 -0.222 -0.048 -0.154 -0.147* -0.113* -0.086*
(0.057)* (0.040) (0.044)* (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
6-10 -0.067 -0.025 -0.036 0.031* -0.015# -0.011
(0.045) (0.049) (0.060) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
11-15 -0.025 -0.072 -0.087 0.069* -0.003 -0.006
(0.033) (0.049) (0.067) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
16-20 -0.091 -0.066 -0.089 0.053* 0.017* -0.003
(0.029)* (0.039) (0.061) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
21-30 -0.047 0.015 -0.051 0.065* 0.035* 0.018*
(0.018)* (0.020) (0.044) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
31+ -0.044 -0.031 -0.074 0.031* 0.028* 0.023*
(0.014)* (0.016)* (0.026)* (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Women
0-5 -0.171 0.012 -0.152 -0.178* -0.235* -0.209*
(0.051)* (0.040) (0.043)* (0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
6-10 -0.034 -0.112 -0.106 -0.007 -0.127* -0.107*
(0.047) (0.052)* (0.051)* (0.012) (0.011) (0.008)
11-15 -0.108 -0.106 -0.105 0.040* -0.086* -0.077*
(0.039)* (0.049)* (0.062) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
16-20 -0.080 -0.014 -0.127 -0.009 -0.008 -0.044*
(0.032)* (0.036) (0.065)* (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
21-30 -0.020 0.014 -0.057 0.003 -0.004 -0.028*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.040) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
31+ -0.030 0.001 -0.061 -0.015* -0.021* -0.020*
(0.022) (0.020) (0.028)* (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Notes: See Table 1
24Table 5c. Effect of time in host country on employment probability of non-white immigrants, 
1980-2000: with respect to native-born workers
Great Britain United States
Years here 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Men
0-5 -0.305 -0.461 -0.352 -0.045* -0.003 -0.016*
(0.042)* (0.044)* (0.051)* (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
6-10 -0.130 -0.223 -0.202 0.046* 0.040* -0.004
(0.027)* (0.053)* (0.057)* (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
11-15 -0.086 -0.140 -0.131 0.050* 0.043* -0.008*
(0.023)* (0.036)* (0.060)* (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
16-20 -0.035 -0.081 -0.042 0.037* 0.044* -0.008*
(0.018) (0.029)* (0.055) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
21-30 -0.063 -0.079 -0.077 0.050* 0.036* 0.009*
(0.023)* (0.020)* (0.035)* (0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
31+ -0.114 -0.089 -0.097 0.011 0.030* 0.000
(0.065) (0.028)* (0.028)* (0.010) (0.006) (0.004)
Women
0-5 -0.289 -0.416 -0.405 -0.069* -0.134* -0.200*
(0.033)* (0.037)* (0.049)* (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
6-10 -0.170 -0.291 -0.284 0.035* -0.021* -0.115*
(0.027)* (0.038)* (0.052)* (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
11-15 -0.116 -0.239 -0.201 0.070* 0.005 -0.069*
(0.028)* (0.036)* (0.051)* (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
16-20 -0.051 -0.084 -0.129 0.022* 0.015* -0.023*
(0.027) (0.030)* (0.050)* (0.009) (0.005) (0.004)
21-30 -0.033 -0.053 -0.076 0.036* 0.017* -0.003
(0.035) (0.023)* (0.035)* (0.010) (0.005) (0.004)
31+ -0.066 0.010 0.056 0.009 -0.016* -0.015*
(0.121) (0.043) (0.033) (0.014) (0.008) (0.005)
Notes: See Table 1
25Table 6a. Age, education controlled effect of time in host country on hourly wage of 
immigrants, 1980-2000: with respect to native-born workers
Great Britain United States
Years here 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Men
0-5 -0.055 -0.093 -0.069 -0.212* -0.237* -0.181*
(0.040) (0.065) (0.032)* (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
6-10 -0.162 -0.042 -0.117 -0.107* -0.175* -0.150*
(0.024)* (0.049) (0.038)* (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
11-15 -0.070 -0.197 -0.094 -0.056* -0.089* -0.110*
(0.019)* (0.046)* (0.042)* (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
16-20 -0.068 -0.156 -0.080 0.008 -0.063* -0.082*
(0.016)* (0.037)* (0.047) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006)
21-30 -0.024 -0.110 -0.059 0.029* 0.013 -0.034*
(0.014) (0.019)* (0.029)* (0.009) (0.007) (0.005)
31+ 0.013 -0.008 -0.065 0.017 0.037* 0.026*
(0.018) (0.022) (0.023)* (0.013) (0.008) (0.007)
Women
0-5 -0.105 0.076 -0.134 -0.107* -0.188* -0.155*
(0.047)* (0.054) (0.033)* (0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
6-10 -0.030 -0.032 -0.047 -0.010 -0.103* -0.101*
(0.025) (0.048) (0.037) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
11-15 -0.060 -0.079 -0.070 0.002 -0.010 -0.060*
(0.024)* (0.048) (0.040) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006)
16-20 -0.030 -0.039 -0.115 0.020 0.001 -0.030*
(0.020) (0.029) (0.046)* (0.011) (0.007) (0.006)
21-30 -0.001 -0.004 -0.043 0.032* 0.022* 0.010*
(0.016) (0.018) (0.025) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
31+ -0.026 0.025 0.004 0.026* 0.027* 0.036*
(0.024) (0.020) (0.022) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006)
Notes: See Table 1
26Table 6b. Effect of time in host country on log real  hourly wage of white immigrants, 1980-
2000: (with regression controls)
Great Britain United States
Years here 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Men
0-5 0.125 0.069 -0.018 -0.103* -0.101* -0.060*
(0.075) (0.083) (0.065) (0.017) (0.014) (0.012)
6-10 -0.036 0.081 -0.003 -0.009 -0.053* -0.035*
(0.052) (0.073) (0.078) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013)
11-15 -0.049 0.062 0.095 0.031 -0.009 -0.006
(0.046) (0.082) (0.088) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014)
16-20 -0.062 -0.005 -0.083 0.072* 0.018 0.012
(0.036) (0.061) (0.090) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
21-30 -0.016 -0.018 -0.027 0.062* 0.057* 0.036*
(0.018) (0.028) (0.047) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
31+ 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.079* 0.055* 0.061*
(0.018) (0.025) (0.040) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008)
Women
0-5 -0.013 0.144 -0.133 -0.089* -0.108* -0.121*
(0.102) (0.064)* (0.063)* (0.020) (0.016) (0.014)
6-10 0.073 0.121 -0.016 0.039* -0.070* -0.041*
(0.050) (0.066) (0.057) (0.020) (0.016) (0.013)
11-15 -0.015 0.078 0.057 0.013 0.011 -0.013
(0.048) (0.067) (0.069) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
16-20 -0.085 0.082 -0.014 0.023 0.003 -0.009
(0.035)* (0.044) (0.089) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014)
21-30 -0.013 0.019 -0.024 0.036* 0.015 0.022*
(0.019) (0.024) (0.048) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
31+ -0.025 0.009 -0.037 0.026 0.034* 0.028*
(0.024) (0.023) (0.032) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008)
Notes: See Table 1
27Table 6c. Effect of time in host country on log real hourly wage of non-white immigrants, 
1980-2000: (with regression controls)
Great Britain United States
Years here 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Men
0-5 -0.161 -0.333 -0.047 -0.252* -0.278* -0.211*
(0.040)* (0.095)* (0.052) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
6-10 -0.211 -0.169 -0.184 -0.137* -0.202* -0.178*
(0.026)* (0.061)* (0.065)* (0.011) (0.007) (0.006)
11-15 -0.079 -0.321 -0.160 -0.101* -0.119* -0.135*
(0.020)* (0.051)* (0.056)* (0.012) (0.008) (0.006)
16-20 -0.069 -0.236 -0.099 -0.048* -0.099* -0.105*
(0.017)* (0.045)* (0.058) (0.015) (0.008) (0.006)
21-30 -0.046 -0.197 -0.131 -0.051* -0.037* -0.063*
(0.021)* (0.026)* (0.044)* (0.017) (0.009) (0.006)
31+ -0.112 -0.102 -0.069 -0.183* -0.050* -0.033*
(0.065) (0.041)* (0.036) (0.033) (0.013) (0.009)
Women
0-5 -0.175 -0.089 -0.206 -0.111* -0.208* -0.164*
(0.038)* (0.095) (0.059)* (0.012) (0.009) (0.008)
6-10 -0.077 -0.178 -0.038 -0.021* -0.110* -0.116*
(0.028)* (0.063)* (0.050) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007)
11-15 -0.085 -0.239 -0.158 -0.001 -0.017* -0.070*
(0.026)* (0.064)* (0.065)* (0.012) (0.009) (0.007)
16-20 0.014 -0.130 -0.130 0.019 -0.004 -0.036*
(0.023) (0.036)* (0.058)* (0.017) (0.008) (0.007)
21-30 0.030 -0.030 -0.115 0.023 0.026* 0.002
(0.032) (0.028) (0.035)* (0.019) (0.009) (0.006)
31+ 0.019 0.087 0.027 0.022 0.003 0.039*
(0.241) (0.036)* (0.032) (0.032) (0.014) (0.009)
Notes: See Table 1
28Table 7a. Regression-controlled ten-year employment probability change by year-of-arrival 
Men Women
1980-90 1990-2000 1980-90 1990-2000
Great Britain
2.5-12.5 yrs here 0.007 -0.016 0.006 0.036
(0.024) (0.029) (0.037) (0.033)
7.5-17.5 yrs here -0.004 0.030 0.052 0.023
(0.019) (0.028) (0.029) (0.033)
12.5-17.5 yrs here 0.033 0.036 0.072 0.058
(0.017) (0.027) (0.027)* (0.032)
17.5-27.5 yrs here 0.042 0.042 0.041 0.103
(0.018)* (0.031) (0.030) (0.034)*
22.5-32.5 yrs here 0.089 0.044 0.052 -0.037
(0.012)* (0.027) (0.033) (0.039)
G.B.-born -0.079 -0.015 0.025 0.003
(0.002)* (0.003)* (0.003)* (0.004)
White Immigrant
2.5-12.5 yrs here 0.019 -0.089 0.029 -0.059
(0.029) (0.065) (0.041) (0.061)
7.5-17.5 yrs here 0.076 0.072 0.080 -0.047
(0.018)* (0.043) (0.038)* (0.064)
12.5-17.5 yrs here 0.062 0.071 0.126 -0.013
(0.024)* (0.041) (0.040)* (0.070)
17.5-27.5 yrs here -0.001 -0.110 -0.009 0.036
(0.045) (0.094) (0.058) (0.077)
22.5-32.5 yrs here 0.050 -0.102 0.082 -0.135
(0.034) (0.080) (0.0575) (0.077)
Non-White Immigrant
2.5-12.5 yrs here -0.011 -0.006 -0.038 0.086
(0.042) (0.040) (0.080) (0.050)
7.5-17.5 yrs here -0.075 -0.057 0.029 0.010
(0.032)* (0.056) (0.044) (0.054)
12.5-17.5 yrs here 0.018 0.020 0.029 0.062
(0.023) (0.040) (0.036) (0.045)
17.5-27.5 yrs here 0.046 0.097 0.051 0.116
(0.021)* (0.031)* (0.037) (0.047)*
22.5-32.5 yrs here 0.098 0.100 0.022 0.065
(0.011)* (0.027)* (0.042) (0.052)
Notes: See Table 1
29Table 7b. Regression-controlled ten-year employment probability change by year-of-arrival 
Men Women
1980-90 1990-2000 1980-90 1990-2000
United States
2.5-12.5 yrs here 0.008 -0.048 0.006 -0.024
(0.008) (0.007)* (0.009) (0.007)*
7.5-17.5 yrs here -0.014 -0.043 -0.028 -0.018
(0.008) (0.006)* (0.008)* (0.007)*
12.5-17.5 yrs here 0.008 -0.062 -0.011 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006)* (0.008) (0.006)
17.5-27.5 yrs here 0.090 0.007 0.082 0.065
(0.003)* (0.004) (0.006)* (0.005)*
U.S.-born -0.028 -0.047 0.065 -0.001
(0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)
White Immigrant
2.5-12.5 yrs here 0.003 0.007 0.014 -0.022
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015)
7.5-17.5 yrs here -0.032 0.025 -0.014 0.027
(0.014)* (0.012)* (0.014) (0.014)
12.5-17.5 yrs here 0.009 0.021 0.013 0.057
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)*
17.5-27.5 yrs here 0.105 0.095 0.102 0.125
(0.005)* (0.007)* (0.013)* (0.010)*
Non-White Immigrant
2.5-12.5 yrs here 0.011 -0.067 -0.001 -0.026
(0.011) (0.009)* (0.013) (0.008)*
7.5-17.5 yrs here -0.007 -0.062 -0.037 -0.031
(0.009) (0.007)* (0.011)* (0.008)*
12.5-17.5 yrs here 0.008 -0.076 -0.019 -0.018
(0.007) (0.006)* (0.009)* (0.006)*
17.5-27.5 yrs here 0.081 -0.017 0.070 0.047
(0.004)* (0.005)* (0.007)* (0.006)*
Notes: See Table 1
30Table 8a. Regression-controlled ten-year log real hourly wage growth by year-of-arrival 
Men Women
1980-90 1990-2000 1980-90 1990-2000
Great Britain
2.5-12.5 yrs here 0.062 0.007 0.123 0.033
(0.039) (0.042) (0.037)* (0.049)
7.5-17.5 yrs here 0.009 0.093 0.086 -0.043
(0.030) (0.052) (0.030)* (0.040)
12.5-17.5 yrs here -0.029 0.153 0.049 -0.004
(0.032) (0.061)* (0.037) (0.054)
17.5-27.5 yrs here -0.000 -0.031 0.039 -0.003
(0.042) (0.082) (0.037) (0.062)
22.5-32.5 yrs here -0.072 -0.020 0.033 -0.166
(0.058) (0.066) (0.056) (0.069)*
G.B.-born 0.139 -0.041 0.181 0.066
(0.003)* (0.004)* (0.003)* (0.004)*
White Immigrants
2.5-12.5 yrs here 0.073 0.032 0.001 0.030
(0.049) (0.069) (0.001) (0.071)
7.5-17.5 yrs here 0.050 0.061 0.001 -0.140
(0.049) (0.077) (0.001) (0.056)*
12.5-17.5 yrs here -0.002 -0.019 -0.030 -0.120
(0.057) (0.092) (0.071) (0.082)
17.5-27.5 yrs here 0.021 -0.210 0.140 0.014
(0.078) (0.130) (0.056)* (0.091)
22.5-32.5 yrs here -0.071 -0.014 0.119 -0.140
(0.104) (0.088) (0.082) (0.100)
Other Immigrants
2.5-12.5 yrs here 0.050 0.013 0.001 0.049
(0.059) (0.057) (0.001) (0.069)
7.5-17.5 yrs here -0.064 0.014 0.000 -0.032
(0.043) (0.072) (0.000) (0.055)
12.5-17.5 yrs here -0.077 0.184 -0.050 0.069
(0.038)* (0.075)* (0.069) (0.074)
17.5-27.5 yrs here -0.023 0.083 0.032 -0.086
(0.049) (0.094) (0.055) (0.082)
22.5-32.5 yrs here -0.071 0.061 -0.069 -0.022
(0.060) (0.099) (0.074) (0.103)
Notes: See Table 1
31Table 8b. Regression-controlled ten-year log real hourly wage growth by year-of-arrival 
Men Women
1980-90 1990-2000 1980-90 1990-2000
U.S.A.
2.5-12.5 yrs here 0.085 0.018 0.049 0.001
(0.015)* (0.011) (0.015)* (0.011)
7.5-17.5 yrs here 0.106 0.037 0.073 -0.003
(0.013)* (0.010)* (0.013)* (0.011)
12.5-17.5 yrs here 0.078 0.091 0.051 0.053
(0.012)* (0.008)* (0.012)* (0.010)*
17.5-27.5 yrs here 0.154 0.127 0.129 0.109
(0.011)* (0.008)* (0.013)* (0.010)*
U.S.-born 0.413 0.288 0.496 0.353
(0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)*
White Immigrants
2.5-12.5 yrs here 0.063 0.031 0.037 0.011
(0.020)* (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
7.5-17.5 yrs here 0.104 0.024 0.052 0.001
(0.022)* (0.022) (0.021)* (0.024)
12.5-17.5 yrs here 0.089 0.071 0.011 0.048
(0.024)* (0.022)* (0.024) (0.024)*
17.5-27.5 yrs here 0.179 0.093 0.157 0.084
(0.023)* (0.022)* (0.027)* (0.024)*
Other Immigrants
2.5-12.5 yrs here 0.095 0.020 0.062 -0.001
(0.021)* (0.013) (0.022)* (0.013)
7.5-17.5 yrs here 0.095 0.043 0.083 -0.004
(0.016)* (0.011)* (0.017)* (0.012)
12.5-17.5 yrs here 0.069 0.097 0.060 0.054
(0.014)* (0.009)* (0.014)* (0.010)*
17.5-27.5 yrs here 0.155 0.147 0.123 0.121
(0.012)* (0.009)* (0.015)* (0.011)*
Notes: See Table 1
32Table A1. Age, education and area of origin controlled effect of time in host country on 
employment probability of immigrants, 1980-2000: with respect to native-born workers
Great Britain United States
Years here 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Men
0-5 -0.302 -0.310 -0.238 0.027* 0.042* 0.018*
(0.036)* (0.036)* (0.026)* (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
6-10 -0.133 -0.163 -0.140 0.094* 0.084* 0.038*
(0.026)* (0.040)* (0.032)* (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
11-15 -0.108 -0.132 -0.120 0.101* 0.084* 0.031*
(0.025)* (0.032)* (0.036)* (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
16-20 -0.086 -0.089 -0.128 0.091* 0.083* 0.037*
(0.021)* (0.026)* (0.037)* (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
21-30 -0.084 -0.058 -0.077 0.099* 0.082* 0.051*
(0.019)* (0.019)* (0.025)* (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
31+ -0.065 -0.083 -0.078 0.077* 0.073* 0.047*
(0.017)* (0.020)* (0.020)* (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Women
0-5 -0.235 -0.241 -0.230 -0.124* -0.176* -0.227*
(0.031)* (0.031)* (0.025)* (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
6-10 -0.121 -0.226 -0.189 -0.006 -0.057* -0.137*
(0.026)* (0.033)* (0.029)* (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
11-15 -0.118 -0.190 -0.187 0.023* -0.025* -0.093*
(0.027)* (0.031)* (0.031)* (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
16-20 -0.115 -0.067 -0.123 -0.026* -0.005 -0.048*
(0.026)* (0.026)* (0.034)* (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
21-30 -0.088 -0.047 -0.035 -0.009 -0.005 -0.027*
(0.024)* (0.020)* (0.023) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
31+ -0.070 -0.053 -0.020 -0.029* -0.025* -0.040*
(0.027)* (0.024)* (0.021) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
Notes: See Table 1
33Table A2. Age, education and area of origin controlled effect of time in host country of 
immigrants on log real hourly wage, 1980-2000 with respect to native-born workers
Great Britain United States
Years here 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Men
0-5 0.005 -0.142 0.134 -0.244* -0.274* -0.215*
(0.060) (0.075) (0.061)* (0.012) (0.007) (0.006)
6-10 -0.095 -0.072 0.080 -0.135* -0.209* -0.187*
(0.051) (0.060) (0.064) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006)
11-15 -0.006 -0.211 0.095 -0.099* -0.128* -0.144*
(0.050) (0.062)* (0.067) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006)
16-20 -0.011 -0.165 0.116 -0.051* -0.111* -0.120*
(0.048) (0.054)* (0.074) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007)
21-30 0.021 -0.131 0.147 -0.061* -0.059* -0.079*
(0.046) (0.040)* (0.064)* (0.013) (0.008) (0.006)
31+ 0.060 -0.053 0.145 -0.086* -0.064* -0.049*
(0.044) (0.041) (0.060)* (0.017) (0.010) (0.008)
Women
0-5 0.004 0.080 0.031 -0.142* -0.249* -0.214*
(0.064) (0.072) (0.058) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008)
6-10 0.092 0.000 0.116 -0.043* -0.165* -0.163*
(0.051) (0.000) (0.064) (0.016) (0.010) (0.008)
11-15 0.055 -0.050 0.102 -0.035* -0.071* -0.120*
(0.053) (0.067) (0.065) (0.016) (0.010) (0.008)
16-20 0.069 -0.010 0.063 -0.019 -0.062* -0.095*
(0.049) (0.055) (0.070) (0.017) (0.009) (0.008)
21-30 0.086 0.014 0.135 -0.010 -0.048* -0.054*
(0.047) (0.051) (0.057)* (0.017) (0.009) (0.007)
31+ 0.063 0.035 0.168 -0.021 -0.041* -0.035*
(0.049) (0.052) (0.055)* (0.019) (0.010) (0.008)
Notes: See Table 1
34Table A3. Age, Education and Area of Origin, regression-controlled ten-year employment 
rate change by year-of-arrival cohort
Men Women
1980-90 1990-2000 1980-90 1990-2000
Great Britain
2.5-12.5 yrs here 0.006 -0.015 0.002 0.027
(0.024) (0.029) (0.038) (0.034)
7.5-17.5 yrs here -0.006 0.028 0.060  0.024
(0.020) (0.028) (0.029)* (0.034)
12.5-17.5 yrs here  0.032 0.031 0.059  0.061
(0.017) (0.028) (0.028)* (0.032)
17.5-27.5 yrs here  0.041  0.041 0.018  0.103
(0.018)* (0.031) (0.032) (0.034)*
22.5-32.5 yrs here  0.088  0.047 0.044 -0.032
(0.011)* (0.027) (0.034) (0.040)
G.B.-born -0.079 -0.015 0.025 0.003
(0.002)* (0.003)* (0.003)* (0.004)
United States
2.5-12.5 yrs here 0.003 -0.060 0.010 -0.023
(0.009) (0.007)* (0.009) (0.007)*
7.5-17.5 yrs here -0.022 -0.060 -0.025 -0.016
(0.008)* (0.007)* (0.009) (0.007)*
12.5-17.5 yrs here -0.005 -0.082 -0.011 -0.007
(0.006) (0.006)* (0.008 (0.005)
17.5-27.5 yrs here 0.085 -0.014 0.085 0.065
(0.004)* (0.004)* (0.007)* (0.005)*
U.S. born -0.028 -0.047 0.065 -0.001
(0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)
Notes: See Table 1
35Table A4. Age, Education and Area of Origin, regression-controlled ten-year log real hourly 
wage growth by year-of-arrival cohort
Men Women
1980-90 1990-2000 1980-90 1990-2000
Great Britain
2.5-12.5 yrs here 0.049 0.022 0.117 0.023
(0.040) (0.041) (0.037)* (0.049)
7.5-17.5 yrs here -0.021 0.073 0.078 -0.043
(0.031) (0.051) (0.030)* (0.039)
12.5-17.5 yrs here -0.057 0.135 0.038 -0.011
(0.032) (0.056)* (0.037) (0.053)
17.5-27.5 yrs here -0.006 -0.006 0.022  0.012
(0.041) (0.078) (0.036) (0.062)
22.5-32.5 yrs here -0.090 -0.017 0.036 -0.152
(0.054) (0.064) (0.054) (0.068)*
G.B.-born 0.139 -0.041 0.181 0.066
(0.003)* (0.004)* (0.003)* (0.004)*
United States
2.5-12.5 yrs here 0.088 0.020 0.047 0.002
(0.015)* (0.011) (0.015)* (0.011)
7.5-17.5 yrs here 0.104 0.036 0.074 -0.001
(0.013)* (0.009)* (0.013)* (0.011)
12.5-17.5 yrs here  0.075  0.089  0.060  0.057
(0.012)* (0.009)* (0.012)* (0.010)*
17.5-27.5 yrs here 0.170  0.139 0.149 0.121
(0.011)* (0.008)* (0.013)* (0.010)
U.S. born 0.413 0.288 0.496 0.353
(0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)*
Notes: See Table 1
36